In response to the poor performance of its public health care provision, Burkina Faso decided, to implement results-based financing (RBF). This strategy relies on a strategic purchase of the quantity and quality of services provided by health workers, monitored by a set of indicators. However, there is a lack of evidence on its effects.
Summary
In response to the poor performance of its public health care provision, Burkina Faso decided, to implement results-based financing (RBF). This strategy relies on a strategic purchase of the quantity and quality of services provided by health workers, monitored by a set of indicators. However, there is a lack of evidence on its effects.
The objective of this article is to appreciate the effect of RBF on a set of maternal and child health (MCH) indicators in Burkina Faso. The study design is quasi-experimental comparative with a control group before and after the implementation of the RBF. To estimate the effect of RBF, we used two methods of analysis: (1) the segmented regression to measure the effect of RBF in the health districts (HD) implementing RBF (RBF HD) and (2) the differencein-difference test to estimate the effect of RBF considering the differences in mean between RBF HD and HD that did not implement RBF (non-RBF HD). We found among five indicators studied that only the postnatal consultation coverage in RBF HD was significantly higher (7.68%; P = 0.04) than in the non-RBF HD. Overall, our findings do not clearly demonstrate the effectiveness of RBF in improving MCH indicators in Burkina Faso.
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Burkina Faso, impact evaluation, quasi-experimental comparative design, results-based financing Developing countries face an inefficient supply of public health care 1 characterized by staff absenteeism, inadequate management of financial resources for health, unavailability of medicines, equity issues with respect to health use, and contribution to health financing. 2, 3 To improve this, promoters of results-based financing (RBF) proposed a strategy that they thought would not only boost the public sector but also improve health and health indicators in general, maternal and child health (MCH) in particular. 4, 5 Since 2007, the World Bank, through a special fund (https://www.rbfhealth.org/mission), has initiated RBF in 28 countries, including 21 in Africa. However, it must be recognized that maternal health indicators are still below the expectations of governments. 6, 7 The RBF strategy proposes deep institutional reforms based on principles such as the remuneration of health care structures according to the quantity and quality of health services provided, the autonomy of management and operation of health care structures the separation of health functions, and increased community participation. 4 Burkina Faso, a poor West African country, has implemented a prepilot phase of RBF from 2011 to 2013 8 and has been in the pilot phase since December 2013. This step covers a population of 4 447 113 inhabitants (25.7% of the total population), 615 health centers (HCs), which constitute the first line of care, 13 district hospitals, the second line of care and the first ref-
erence level, and four regional hospitals (RHs), the second reference level. An institutional framework has been created for the RBF coordination, specifying the actors and their roles, the information, and payment circuits of the various entities. 9, 10 Among these key actors is the Contracting and Audit Agency, an independent agency responsible for ensuring the monthly quantitative verification of the activities to be "bought by the RBF" in the HCs-and in the presence of the providers-as well as the user satisfaction survey, which is conducted each trimester. The management structures (district executive team and regional health directorate) perform trimester qualitative checkups to grant quality bonuses to providers. This qualitative check is made on the basis of an observation grid. Health center subsidies are based on these checkups and paid out through the support plan to health development and serve not only to motivate the staff but also, and above all, to strengthen the local health system. With the RBF, in addition to the monthly wage and the usual motivations, the service providers receive bonuses according to the quantity of patients seen, the quality of care, and the satisfaction of the users. A performance contract is signed between the service providers and the administrative supervisory authorities (town hall or regional council). Providers can manage these premiums with some autonomy to achieve the performance improvement plan.
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Studies of the effectiveness of RBF in improving health indicators show lukewarm results, and there is considerable criticism of this strategy for its lack of evidence. [11] [12] [13] In Burkina Faso, the study by Steenland et al 8 evaluating the prepilot phase by a difference-in-difference method, comparing three RBF districts with three other non-RBF districts and focusing on only four MCH indicators, had shown encouraging results. However, one of the limitations of this study was the nonrandom nature of the choice of districts as well as the lack of hindsight to appreciate the effect of the RBF. The objective of this article is to evaluate, over a longer and more robust period, the potential of the RBF strategy in improving the performance of health districts (HDs) in Burkina Faso by focusing on MCH indicators.
| Type of study
The design of the study is a quasi-experimental comparative one with a control group and observations before and after the establishment of RBF. The periods before and after correspond to 2013-2014 and 2014-2016, respectively.
Two methods allow retrospective quantitative analysis of MCH indicators: (1) interrupted time series (or segmented linear regression), a reliable method to measure the association between RBF and the health indicator chosen for our study, 18 and (2) the double difference or difference in difference (DID) that combines the two counterfactuals (before-after comparisons and comparisons with-without RBF). 19 
| Choice of MCH indicators
Twenty-three and 24 health indicators are monitored and bought by the RBF with respectively 15 and 16 MCH indicators at the level of health facilities at the first and second line levels. We excluded maternal health indicators that were not correctly collected 20 : the number of deliveries performed with partogram and the fourth antenatal consultations (ANC4).
Indeed, many partograms are performed after deliveries and are reported as ANC4 women who come to the ANC clinic in the ninth month regardless of the number of ANC consultations attended before. Five indicators were selected:
• Coverage at the first antenatal consultation in the first trimester of pregnancy (ANC1T1): number of ANC1 pregnancies performed in the first trimester on expected pregnancies;
• Postnatal consultation coverage (PNC): number of PNCs on expected deliveries;
• Complete vaccination coverage: number of fully vaccinated children among children of 0 to 11 months;
• Utilization rate of modern contraceptive methods: number of women using modern contraceptive methods among women of reproductive age per year; and
• Caesarean section rate: number of caesareans performed among women from a specific area during a specific period divided by the number of expected births in the same area for the same period of time.
| Choice of study districts
On 26 December 2013, the year that marked the beginning of the RBF intervention, there was a total of 70 HDs, including 15 implementing RBF. Of the 15 RBF HDs, we excluded the three HDs (Boulsa, Léo, and Titao) that had already implemented RBF since 2011 and therefore for which we do not have available data in the RBF health data warehouse before the intervention. We also excluded the four HDs (Koudougou, Ouahigouya, Tenkodogo, and Kaya) with RH as their first referral hospital (indeed, the RH receives referrals from all the HDs in the region, and the database we have does not disaggregate data by district of origin). The remaining eight RBF HDs, namely, Batié, Diébougou, Gourcy, Nouna, Ouargaye, Kongoussi, Sapouy, and Solenzo, were all included in the analysis (Figure 1 ).
We selected an equal number of HD controls among the eligible HDs. After the withdrawal of the 15 RBF HDs, we excluded from the remaining 55 HDs (1) 10 HDs with an RH as first referral hospital for the same reasons mentioned above; (2) 14 HDs having no hospital with surgery because the evolution of the caesarean section rate is a central indicator in our analysis; (3) the six urban HDs of the city of Ouagadougou (Baskuy, Bogodogo, Sig-Nonhghin, Nongr-Masson, and Boulmiougou) and the urban HD of the city of Bobo-Dioulasso (Dô), because the RBF HD selected in our sampling are all rural; and (4) the HD receiving specific funding to conduct activities in favor of reproductive health (Séguenega, Pouytenga, Koupela Bitou, and Garango). Indeed, such specific funding may bias maternal health outcomes. After exclusion of these HDs, we still have 20 HDs from which we randomly selected eight no-RBF HDs: Toma, Po, Manga, Boromo, Gorom-Gorom, Dano, Yako, and Ziniare ( Figure 1 ). These eight no-RBF HDs have similar characteristics to the retained RBF HDs (Table 1) .
| Collection and source of data
For our study, we collected monthly observations of the indicators from 2013 to 2016 at the second line level of the 16 HDs. The data were gathered from the National Health Information System with the following sources:
(1) the statistical yearbook [21] [22] [23] [24] and (2) the national health data warehouse.
2.6 | Data processing and analysis
| Time series analysis
Segmented linear regressions 25 were used for the analysis of time series of routine data over the period from January 2013
to December 2016. We thus had 48 monthly observation points, each observation point corresponding to a monthly average of the indicator in the eight RBF districts. The model used to derive the effect of the introduction of the RBF was estimated on these time series data on the basis of the equation: Yt = β0 + β1 * time + β2 * FBRt + β3 * post-FBRt + ei, where:
• Yt represents the dependent variable, which is the monthly average of the chosen indicator (it alternately represents the five indicators chosen for our study, see above).
• β0 represents the average basic result level at time "0" in the eight RBF HDs (beginning of the study period, ie, January 2013).
• time represents the monthly period; the coefficient β1 thus gives an estimate of the average time evolution of Yt independent of the RBF intervention.
• RBFt is a binary variable, equal to 0 when there is no RBF at time t and to 1 when there is RBF at period t;
the coefficient β2 estimates the immediate average effect of RBF on Yt.
• Post-RBFit represents a zero time variable before the introduction of RBF, then sequential (1, 2, 3, …) after RBF introduction; β3 thus reflects the evolution of the trend, or the growth rate of the results, after RBF intervention.
• Finally, ei represents the error term.
It is important to control for the autocorrelation in time series data. For that purpose, we used the standard econometric approach of performing a Durbin-Watson test to check the presence of autocorrelation (an absolute value of about 2 indicating no signs of autocorrelation). When autocorrelation was detected, we used the Prais-Winsten generalized least squares estimator to estimate each of the regressions to ensure that one of the assumptions of our model has not been violated or that the coefficients and P values are not distorted and then became noninterpretable.
Two models have been estimated: model 1 is the unadjusted simple linear regression for the first-order autocorrelation, and model 2 is the same model using the Prais-Winsten estimates to correct the autocorrelation of the data if there is need. The data analysis was performed using Stata version 13, and a P value less than 0.05 was considered as statistically significant.
For most indicators, we appreciated the effects of RBF after 3 months of implementation in RBF HD (assuming that we need a period of 3 months to observe the effect of an intervention). For ANC1T1 coverage, we assessed it 6 months later, because we believe that the providers need a minimum of 6 months to master the intervention and reach the target population, the women who recently got pregnant, before seeing the effects on the field. We thought that the women who are already pregnant at the time of the implementation of RBF cannot be included in our analysis and that the changes in attitudes of providers towards them (good reception, reduction of informal payments, and achievement of sensitization during ANC) should have a favorable impact on those who became pregnant afterward, which gives us a slightly later effect of the RBF on the ANC1T1 compared with the other indicators.
For the dependent variable full immunization coverage, we added a "stock out of vaccine" variable to take into account the impact of the national yellow fever vaccine shortage observed in the field.
| Difference-in-difference analysis
We used the double difference (DID) method to estimate the effect of RBF 19 on each of the five MCH indicators. For this purpose, we used two periods-before (2013-2014) and after (2014-2016)-and two groups of HD-eight HDs with RBF (RBF HD) and eight HDs without (non-RBF HD). We have not exploited the broad time frame of our dataset (48 mo for 16 HDs) because we expected a problem of autocorrelation of errors, which could have biased the standard deviations and consequently the P values. The literature proposes a number of methods and instruments to correct this problem. 26 The simplest method, and the one we have chosen, consists in ignoring time series data when calculating the standard error, ie, calculating the average before and after the implementation of the intervention (RBF) and performing a simple regression with the ordinary least squares estimator on this dataset with only two points in time. This is the reason why we took the period 2013-2014 (before RBF setup) and the period 2014-2016 (after RBF) as fixed periods. The DID method calculates the estimated impact according to the following formula:
• We calculated the difference in outcome between the situation before (average observed over [2013] [2014] and the situation after (average observed over 2014-2016) for all RBF and non-RBF HD); this is the first difference (level of the indicator after "B" − level of the indicator before "A").
• We averaged the differences for RBF HD (E = Sum (B − A)/8) and non-RBF HD (F = Sum (B − A)/8).
• We calculated the average difference between the difference in results for RBF HD and the difference for non-RBF HD (E − F).
• And we performed the Student t test to assess whether this double difference is statistically significant.
The DID obtained estimates the change in the performance indicator attributable to RBF since the compared HD provided an accurate estimate of the change in outcome that would have prevailed if the RBF program was not implemented. The data analysis was performed using Stata version 13, and a P value less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant.
For a correct interpretation of our results and to ensure a good estimate of the effect of RBF on our indicators, we needed to ensure that both the RBF and no-RBF HD were comparable and similar.
For that purpose, we tested the hypothesis of parallel trend and performed a test of difference on the averages before the implementation of RBF. 19 The parallel trend hypothesis test aims to ensure that changes in the activity levels of the RBF HD and the non-RBF HD over the prior periods were similar. To achieve this, we performed econometric regressions on the monthly data before the implementation of RBF with 13 observations for the RBF group and 13 observations for the non-RBF group using the following model: The mean difference test prior to the implementation of RBF is performed to ensure that the HDs of our study were similar before the implementation of RBF. In this respect, we performed difference tests on the aggregate averages over the period 2013-2014 between RBF and non-RBF HDs for all the indicators that were investigated.
We received a formal approval from the Directorate General of Studies and Statistics Sector of the Ministry of Health of Burkina Faso (23 February 2017) , authorizing us to use these secondary routine data.
3 | RESULTS
| Comparability of district groups

| Hypothesis of parallel trends
The econometric regressions on the monthly data before the start of RBF show that the trends of the different indicators before the RBF are relatively similar. We can see it through the time variable RBF that systematically gives a P value higher than 0.10 for all the indicators (Tables A1-A5 ).
| Mean difference tests before the implementation of RBF
The mean difference tests performed over the 2013-2014 period (ie, before RBF intervention) show no significant differences in PNC coverage, caesarean section rate, complete vaccination coverage, and contraceptive use rate.
However, the test is significant for ANC1T1 (Table A6 ), but this does not jeopardize the findings related to this
Given these arguments, we can consider that groups, RBF and non-RBF, are comparable. increased by 0.27% points each month (which is equivalent to about +4% points each year) (P = 0.02). No significant autocorrelation was found in the data. However, it should be noted that this coverage did not reach 35% throughout the study period, indicating that the effect of RBF on ANC1T1 coverage was limited (Table B1 ). The DID test shows a positive but nonsignificant impact of the RBF intervention. The ANC1T1 coverage increased by 3.9% points between before and after in the RBF group, while it increased by only 2.1% points in the non-RBF group, suggesting a nonsignificant impact of the RBF of 1.8% points (P = 0.44) ( Table 2 ).
| Postnatal consultation coverage
Before the establishment of RBF, non-RBF HDs showed a stagnant PNC coverage, an evolution similar to that of RBF HDs, but systematically lower (Figure 3 ). After the introduction of RBF, the evolution of PNC coverage in RBF HDs clearly stood out against the non-RBF HDs where the coverage stagnated. This suggests that this indicator has improved with RBF. The analysis of the time series data, after correcting the autocorrelation, shows that 6 months after the implementation of RBF, there was a positive effect of 7.7% (P = 0.048) on the indicator. The negative growth rate found after RBF intervention is not significant (Table B2 ). The DID test showed that PNC coverage increased by 14.3% points between before and after periods in the RBF group, whereas it increased by only 5.2%
points in the non-RBF group, suggesting a significant impact of 9.1% points (P = 0.033) ( Table 2 ). 
| Contraceptive prevalence rate
Contraceptive prevalence rates have showed little change over the study period. The highest rates can be seen in both groups in 2015 and 2016, which can be attributed to the organization of a national family planning promotion campaign that takes place every year ( Figure 4 ). The analysis of the time series data shows, after correcting the autocorrelation in the data, that at the beginning of the observation, the contraceptive prevalence rate was 32.6%
in the RBF HD. There was no significant change in the month-to-month rate (β1 = −0.1, P = 0.8; β3 = 0.16, P = 0.66). After the start of the intervention, in the RBF HD, a nonsignificant increase of about 3% was observed (P = 0.35) ( Table B3) . The DID test also shows a positive but not significant impact of the RBF intervention. The contraceptive prevalence rate increased by 4.1% points between before and after in the RBF group, while it increased by only 0.9% points in the non-RBF group, suggesting an impact of RBF of 3.2% points, however not significant (P = 0.23) ( Table 2) . Differences are expressed in % points; the before and after periods correspond to the averages observed respectively over 2013-2014 and 2014-2016; the before-after differences reported here correspond to the average between the eight RBF districts and the eight non-RBF districts (each time eight observations). 
| Complete vaccination coverage
The coverage was 100% for this indicator in both HD groups before the introduction of RBF. The evolution in the two groups seems similar. It shows a drop in the second trimester of 2016 (second vertical line in Figure 5 ), which is linked to a national shortage of yellow fever vaccine: We took this into account in the model. After correcting for autocorrelation, the time series analysis shows a nonsignificant negative impact of the RBF intervention on vaccination coverage of 3.2% (P = 0.831). The DID test also suggests a negative but not significant impact of 2% points (P = 0.61) (Table B4 ). Figure 6 shows a gradual increase of caesarean section rate in RBF HD, which is not observed in non-RBF HD.
| Caesarean section rate
Despite a significant increase of this rate in the RBF HDs, it remained below 3% over the entire study period. At the beginning of the RBF intervention, less than one caesarean was performed per 100 expected deliveries in RBF HD. There was an increase of 0.17% points in caesarean section rate after RBF setup, which is not statistically significant (P = 0.381). An autocorrelation in the data was found, and after correction, the model does still not indicate a significant RBF effect on the caesarean section rate (Table B5) . Comparing RBF and non-RBF HD with the DID test, the same nonsignificant effect for the caesarean section rate of 0.03% points (P = 0.134) was observed ( Table 2 ).
| DISCUSSION
The analysis of the evolution of the studied indicators suggests that RBF had an effect on only one indicator, the PNC. For the other indicators, no significant effect was found.
This effect of RBF on postnatal consultation confirms the results of the evaluation of the prepilot project that showed a significant increase in PNC coverage of 9.5% (95% CI, 6.1-12.9). 8 The underlying program theory would indicate an influence of supply and demand. Indeed, on the supply side, RBF has likely made services more accessible, improved interpersonal communication between the providers and the women about the importance of PNC, and stimulated efforts to better respect the women's privacy and confidentiality during PNC in cleaner facilities. In the field, during our supervision, it was noted in some HCs that community staff had been recruited to keep the buildings clean, curtains were put on windows and doors, and gifts were given to women who respected their appointment. On the demand side, it can be hypothesized that women were satisfied with the reception and behavior of providers towards them during prenatal consultations, which facilitated the continuity of PNC. Even though ANC is free and may decrease one of the barriers to access,towards providers, there was no significant effect of RBF on ANC1T1 coverage. Our results are similar to those of the prepilot project evaluation, where they found a nonsignificant increase in ANC1T1 coverage of 2.3% (95% CI, 0.45-4.23). 8 This result suggests that RBF did not change women's behavior to come early when they are pregnant.
This could be explained by structural barriers (distance and indirect costs 28 ) or the need to maintain absolute kinsadiscretion about pregnancy in the first trimester. 29 Also, the current organization of ANC does not allow a woman whose pregnancy is not visible to follow ANC with the others who proudly deal with their pregnancy.
Another factor is the lack of autonomy of some women both in terms of decision to go to the HC and in terms of resources needed to get there, 30 which does not favor early ANC. 27 In addition, we suppose that there is a period of latency between the time when some pregnant women who have benefited from good care related to the change in behavior of providers share their experience and the moment when newly pregnant women, convinced by the experience of the first group, decide to go early to attend the ANC.
Sociocultural factors may also explain the lack of effect of RBF on the contraceptive prevalence rate. 28 Binyaruka et al showed in Tanzania a slight nonsignificant difference in the use of any contraceptive method between the RBF group and the non-RBF group. 13 Bellows et al in their review of 28 performance incentive programs on communitybased family planning showed mixed results, although there was a clear increase in use of contraceptives in six programs. 28 A recent meeting of experts on systematic reviews of family planning funding mechanisms did not show a strong link between RBF and family planning use or reproductive health outcome in poor-or middle-income countries. 29 In
Burkina Faso, contraceptive prevalence reached about 35% in the districts where studies were conducted. Given that national contraceptive prevalence is estimated at 22.5% for all women of childbearing age in 2016, 30 there are concerns about the quality of the collected data. Nevertheless, Burkina Faso is in a dynamic of "repositioning" family planning with the organization of the National Family Planning Week and the action of nongovernmental organizations like Marie Stopes International, which could increase the level of this indicator in these HDs.
Results-based financing had no effect on complete immunization coverage, which had already reached a high level of performance in HD; it would have been difficult to do better with RBF, and one wonders why this indicator was introduced in the RBF indicators list. These results are similar to those of Johnson et al 12 in Benin.
The caesarean section rate, despite the increase observed in the RBF HD (but already before the introduction of RBF), remained below 3%. To understand why the caesarean section rate has remained low, several explanations can be considered. On the one hand, we found that in RBF HD, the percentage of pregnancies referred among expected pregnancies has very little increased from 1 year to another. On the other hand, the quality and the acceptability of referral have not improved. 31 Indeed, in the field, some people do not want going to the hospital in case of obstetric complication due to financial or cultural reasons. If health care workers are scornful, 32 if they are not reassuring, or if the referral system is too expensive for the woman and her family, then this becomes an insurmountable obstacle even when women require a caesarean section. 27 Finally, our field experience shows that the functioning of the operating theater did not really change with RBF. Indeed, before its introduction, many difficulties were encountered in the functioning of these theaters (defective and obsolete equipment, not enough staff, …). The same is true for ambulances (old and insufficient vehicles and frequent breakdowns). Moreover, official incentives are not considered attractive enough compared with informal payments.
Some more general contextual factors may also explain the poor results of RBF. 20, 33, 34 First, the contextual factors related to the implementation of the RBF program itself. The design of the RBF program involves many actors at different levels of the health system that leads to difficulties of coordination, delay in performing planned activities (including the recruitment of the Contracting and Audit Agency), a disparity in human, financial, materials available to HCs for RBF implementation, insufficient resources for RBF coordination, amount of financial motivation considered unsatisfactory by health care providers, and long-term and late payment of premiums. [35] [36] [37] Secondly, we have contextual factors related to the health system. At the beginning of the program, there was some enthusiasm among providers for self-training through qualitative auditing sessions, 35 but soon, the late payment of premiums reduced this dynamism. The implementation of RBF did not solve the difficulties related to the acquisition of medical equipment by the HCs. Thus, the shortage in essential drugs and vaccines has occurred. 38 The question of the availability of human resources remained unresolved, as was also found by Paul et al in their study on RBF in Benin. 39 It is the same situation about the availability and condition of infrastructures and equipment that have remained below the standards despite the implementation of RBF. Finally, there are contextual factors related to the country's environment, which must be considered when analyzing the results of the various interventions in Burkina Faso. The popular uprising in 2014 with several strike movements of the unions claiming better working conditions and salary that followed have altered the functioning of RBF. We must not forget the precariousness of the social position of women in Burkina Faso. Women in rural areas are poor, poorly educated, and less autonomous and undergo many sociocultural constraints that prevent them from accessing the care they need. 40 Finally, the government's lack of commitment to RBF funding, which remains heavily dependent on external sources, may explain the poor results obtained, 41 as observed in Chad. 42 
| Strengths and weaknesses of the study
We used two types of analysis-time series analysis and double difference analysis-so that the limits of one method are compensated for by the strengths of the other (and vice versa). Thus, we were able to analyze in addition to the immediate effect of RBF the sustainability of the RBF effect on the five MCH indicators we studied.
However, our study has limits, such as the quality of the data collected. Indeed, in our opinion, the complete vaccination coverage above 100% testifies the inaccuracy of the target populations according to their calculation.
The time series limits are that the effects observed cannot be attributed with certainty to RBF since there have probably been concomitant events/interventions that have had an impact on the indicators.
The Difference-in-difference analysis is a method that allows us to attribute the effects observed to the RBF with greater certainty, if the parallel trend hypotheses are verified. However, we have relatively few observations (eight in the RBF group and eight in the non-RBF group) that weaken our estimations. Also, because of a lack of availability and accessibility to qualitative data, we could not perform a multivariate double difference analysis with fixed effects to control for the unobservable characteristics of districts that could act on the implementation of the intervention, but also on the results (for example, the leadership of the health workers, their level of adhesion and appropriation of RBF, the quality of services, and the relations between the health workers and the patients).
| CONCLUSION
The study showed that the only indicator for which a significant increase was highlighted after the implementation of the RBF is the PNC. Our results showed a lukewarm effect of RBF on the improvement of MCH indicators in Burkina
Faso. This suggests that a deep reflection is needed on the incentive system (internal or external). 43 Further research on the social determinants of health-and internal or external factors that can truly improve the level of MCH indicators in Burkina Faso-must be conducted; and finally, the monitoring system of the HD performance must be improved. Also, further action should be performed to improve access to MCH services in Burkina Faso. Abbreviations: HD, health district; RBF, results-based financing; C-section, Caesarean section.
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APPENDIX B RESULTS OF TWO MODELS OF LINEAR REGRESSION PER INDICATOR
